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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER

G.

VERNIER AND HAROLD SHEPHERD

ATTEmprs.

State v. Stutzner, La., 95 So. 701. Attempted sabornation of perjury no
offense.
The principal case held that it was no offense to attempt to procure a witness to swear falsely in a criminal prosecution although a statute (Sec. 857,
Rev. Sts.) made it a felony to commit or to procure the commission of perjury. Said the court: "The statute does not denounce an attempt to procure
a person to commit perjury, therefore, however reprehensible it is, an attempt
at subornation is not made a crime."
By the common -law every attempt to commit a felony, whether it be a
common law crime or by statute, is a misdemeanor (Clark, Cr. Law, 3rd ed.,
139). This, of course, would not necessarily be the rule in Louisiana, where
the civil law obtains, nor does there appear to be any general statutory provision in the state making an attempt an independent crime.
HO IcIDE.
Stroud v. State, Miss., 95 So. 738. Conditional threat to kill not assault
with intent to commit murder.
In the principal case the defendant drew his pistol, cocked it, pointed it
at the head of Sanders and said with an oath that unless he (Sanders) signed
certain papers he would kill him. Acting under this threat, S signed the papers.
Held, that the facts did not support a charge of assault with intent to commit
murder for the intent to kill had never yet come into existence and might
never do so and would only in the event of S not signing. "Nevertheless,
the rule is well settled that it is the conditional threat, whether such condition
is right or wrong, that relieves the assaulter of the intent to kill and murder."
INFO

IATION.

State v. McDaniels, N. D., 192 N. W. 974. When necessary to negative
in an information an exception in a crimenal statute.
The statute in question prohibited the manufacture or sale of intoxicating
liquors but contained a proviso excepting the manufacture or sale of liquors
when .permitted by Federal statute. The information in the instant case
charged the offense without negativing the exception made in the statute. Held,
that the information need not negative the exception, for the exception in no
way tended to define or qualify the substantive crime, hence, strictly speaking,
formed no part of the state's case, but was purely a matter to -be raised by
way of defense.
The case is right and is perfectly consistent with the rule in civil cases
requiring the plaintiff in an action founded upon a statute to strictly bring
himself within the statutory requirements by negativing the existence of any
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facts mentioned in .the statute which go to the substance of the right itself
as distinguished from a matter of limitation which need not be negatived in the
complaint. (See Baker v. H. J. R. R. Co., 91 Mo. 86, Sharrow v. Infand Lines,
L. R. A., 1915, E. 1192 Ann., for collection of cases.)
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Cooke v. Comnonwealth, Ky., 250 S. W. 802.
chasing liquor admissable.

Testimony of officers pur-

Officers who purchase intoxicating liquor, not for the purpose of inducing
the commission of a crime, but only to detect the existence of the unlawful
traffic, do not participate in the offense so as to make them particeps criminis;
and their testimony is not thereby brought under the rule as to accomplices.
It has been suggested that the explanation is that the officer decoy is not an
accomplice at all because of the lack on his part of the intent to commit crime,
the intent being negatived by the purpose of detection. But quaere whether
in a case of extreme zeal on the part of the officer this- may not be more a
a question of motive, leaving the requisite intent intact, especially in the case
of purely statutory and regulatory measures. It seems quite clear that the
element of public policy in the detection of crime enters.
Even if the officer were an accomplice, a conviction founded upon his
testimony would be good at common law and it would be discretionary with
the court, in the absence of statute, whether the jury should be cautioned
against convicting upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice; a
failure so to caution has been held not to be error. Smith v. S., 37 Ala. 472;
State v. Litchfield, 57 Me. 267.
State v. Clark, Minn., 192 N. W ....
quent to one charged admissable.

Evidence; evidence of sales subse-

Defendant was accused of selling intoxicating liquors on March 18, 1922,
and the court admitted evidence of subsequent sales as late as July 8th under
the rule allowing evidence of similar acts or crimes to show a system or plan.
That evidence of similar bad acts or crimes is admissable for such a purpvse
is well settled although when so admitted it should clearly appear, as pointed
out by Wigmore in his Evidence, that there is an element in addition to that
when other bad acts are admitted to show intent, namely, a general scheme or
plan of which the acts in question are but manifestations.
People v. England, Mich., 192 N. W. 612. Sale to a police decoy no defense.
The defendant sold liquor to a police decoy who made repeated inducements and assurances that it could be safely done. Held, that the inducements
and assurances of the officer constituted no defense. The doctrine of the case
is clearly sound. Wrong as it may seem to our moral sense for officers to
actively instigate and procure the commission of crime in order to secure
convictions, nevertheless, unless the acts of procurement have gone so far as
to negative on the defendant's part either the essential mental element of the
crime or the act itself (as, for example, where the acts of inducement actually
amount to consent in larceny cases), they can constitute no legal defense.
Accord People v. Murphy, 93 Mich. 41, 52 N. W. 1042.
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TRMA.
Cornwell v. State, Ohio, 140 N. E. 363. New trial awarded for dis-agreement
of defendant's counsel in conducting defense.
Where counsel employed by defendant and counsel appointed by the state
to assist in his defense were unable to agree as to the line of defense to be
adopted, and engaged in continuous wrangling in the presence of th jury, each
charging the other with withholding information, and each giving contradictory
advice to the client, held, that a new trial will be awarded.
State v. Rasmussen, Wash., 215 Pac. 332. Effect of allowing jury to separate
'without defendant's consent.
Where, in a felony prosecution, the jury was allowed to separate for an
entire week during adjournment without defendant's consent, that defendant
failed to object at the time of the separation, did not avoid the prejudicial effect
thereof, since it was the plain mandatory duty of the court to keep the jury
together, unless consent to their separaion was plainly evidenced in an affirmative manner.
I People v. Zumela, Calif., 215 Pac. 907. Failure to impose sentence within
prescribed time.
Failure to impose sentence within the time prescribed by Pen. Code, Sec.
1191, held an error of procedure merely, not resulting in a miscarriage of justice
within Const., Art. 6, Sec. 4Y2, so as to warrant reversal for purpose fo having
new trial under Pen. Cod, Sec. 1202.
FoRmERn

JEOPADY.

Collins v. Loisel, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 618. Preliminary examination does not
constitute jeopardy.
The constitutional provision in the Fifth Amendment against double jeopardy
cannot apply, unless a prisoner has theretofore been placed on trial, and the
preliminary examination of one arrested on suspicion is not a trial, so that his
discharge under a warrant of arrest for extradition does not bar a subsequent
arrest on new papers for the same offense.
The precise question appears not to have been passed upon by this court
in any case involving international extradition.
HomIciDE.
Stqte v. Habig, Ohio, 140 N. E. 195. When homicide "committed in perpetrating robbery.'
Where several persons have jointly committed the crime of robbery of several victims and have taken from one or more of them property of value and
are fleeing from the scene of the robbery and immediately thereafter one of
the victims runs a short distance in the opposite direction and notifies policeman
of the crime and the direction in which the robbers are fleeing, and the policemen pursue the robbers and intercept them within a few minutes thereafter, and
when the robbers have proceeded in their flight a distance of not more than
five city squares and while they are still in flight carrying the proceeds of the
robbery which had not yet been divided among them and the robbers refuse to
surrender and one of their number shoots a policeman and inflicts injurids result-
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ing in his death, such homicide is committed in perpetrating a robbery. Conrad
v. State, 75 Ohio St. 52, 78 N. E. 957, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1154, 8 Ann. Cas. 966,
approved and .followed.
LAacN'y.
P. v. Otis, N. Y., 139 N. E. 562. Liquor unlawfully possessed as subject
of larceny.
National Prohibition Act, tit. 2, Sec. 25 et seq., must be construed as a
whole in the light of the general object, and, though it is declared that "no
property rights shall exist," in liquor illegally possessed, a conviction for larceny
of liquor illegally possessed will be sustained, since the value of the chattel'
to its possessor is not the test as .to whether it is subject to larceny.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

Cunard S. S. Co., et al. v. Mellon, 43 Sup. Ct. Repr. 504. Intoxicating liquors.
Territory subject to 18th Amendment.
Const. Amend. 18, prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquor within
or the importation there6f into the United States and territory subject to its jurisdiction, uses the word "territory" as meaning the regional areas of land and
adjacent waters over which the United States claims and exercises dominion and
control as a sovereign power.
The territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States includes the
land areas under its dominion and control, the ports, harbors, bays, and other
inclosed arms of the sea along the coast, and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line outward a marine league or three geographical miles, and
all of this territory constitutes the field of operation of the.Eighteenth Amendment.
The Prohibition Amendment "covers, and is confined to, the physical territory of the United States, and does not apply to domestic merchant ships outside
the waters of the United States, whether on the high seas or in foreign waters,
but does apply to foreign merchant ships when within the territorial waters of
the United States.
Mr. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissenting.
EVIDENC&

State v. Chuchola, Dela., 120 Atl. 212. Intoxicatingliquor may be used in
evidence though illegally seized.
Though property taken illegally from a person suspected of crime should be
returned on proper proceedings, even though it would be competent evidence
against him, under 29 Del. Laws, c. 10, sec. 2, providing that the possession of
intoxicating liquor constitutes the crime, intoxicating liquor is not property, and,
though illegally seized, may be used in evidence without violating any constitutional provision.
Rodney, J., dissenting.
State v. Dena, N. Mex., 214 Pac. 583. Whether confession voluntary.
Where it affirmatively appears from the state's evidence that the accused,
being Indians, unable to speak the English language, asked the deputy sheriff
who then had them under arrest and in his custody if they would be hurt if they
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confessed, that such officer assured them they would not be hurt, and that it
would be better for them to tell the truth, such 'confessions made immediately
thereafter are not admissible.
HOM ICIDE.
Commonwealth v. Newson, Pa., 120 AtI. 707.
fidelity by a mistress not provocations.

Statements indicative of in-

Where defendant disarmed and shot a woman with whom he had been living
when she refused to return to him, after statements by her that she did not want
him, but only his money, that she had not been true to him, and had tried to
dope him, refusal to give an instruction based on the words used by deceased
as raising a reasonable doubt whether defendant acted with deliberation held
proper.
INDICTMENT.

State v. Mlitchell, Idaho, 214 Pac. 217. Indictment charging taking of "currency" sustained by proof of taking silver coin.
A charge of robbery by feloniously taking from one's person "currency" of
a certain value is sustained by proof of the felonious taking of silver coin.
INSANITY.
McHargue v. State, Ind., 13 N. E. 316. Instruction that insan'ity not inferable from certain facts held erroneous as invading the province of jury.
An instruction that "the jury is not warranted in inferring that a man is
insane from the mere fact of his committing a crime, or from the enormity of
the crime, or from the mere apparent absence of motive for it," held errnoeous
under Const. art. 1, sec. 19 (Burns' Ann. St., 1914, see. 64), as invading the
province of the jury, who had a right to decide what inferences they will draw
from the facts proved.
Commonwealth v. Bryson, Pa., 120 Atl. 552. Court's comment on medical
theories of insanity held not belittling physicians testinony.
In a murder prosecution, the court's remarks that, to determine the existence
of insanity, the law applies the right and wrong test, "one which men can understand, not the refinement or distinctions of medical science," held not reversible
error as belittling the testimony of physicians, being adequately corrected by .a
subsequent instruction to carefully consider the expert testimony of the doctors
on both sides.
TRIAL.
State v. Newmnan, Mont., 213 Pac. 805.
In a trial for rape defendant objected to the competency of the prosecutrix
on the ground that she was his common law wife. The trial judge overruled
the objection, remarking: "we will presume she is not."
Held properly convicted, since defendant could not prevent the witness testifying by merely asserting incompetency, without proving it.
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Galen, J., dissented.

People v. Krakowski, Ill., 139 N. E. 399. Presence of accused when verdict
returned presumed under facts.
Where the common-law record showed that accused was present during the
trial, 'but did not affirmatively show that he was present when the verdict was
received before a judge other than the one who presided at the trial, held, in
view of the fact that the whole proceeding was completed within two successive
days, the presence of the accused when the verdict was returned might be fairly
implied.
Tillery v. State, Olda., 214 Pac. 198. Placing part of jury in one room and
part in another, in'charge of different bailiffs, not failure to keep jury together.
Where, after the law and the evidence were finally submitted to the jury,
and the jury placed in charge of two bailiffs, who were admonished to keep the
jury together, the bailiffs took the jury to a hotel for the purpose of procuring
lodging for the night, and seven of the jurors were placed in one room in charge
of one of the bailiffs, and five in another room i charge of the other bailiff,
this constitutes no substantial deviation from the court's order.
State v. Seidel, Kans., 214 Pac. 565. Correcting verdict for mistake of law.
When various forms of verdict in a criminal case are submitted to a jury,
and by mistake they enter a verdict on one of these forms which apparently
found the defendant guilty of a .misdemeanor when it was obvious that, if the
jury were honest men, they must have intended to find him guilty of a felony,
it was not prejudicial error for the trial court to make reasonable comment and
inquiry concerning the verdict; and, when such comment and inquiry of the
court elicited responses from the jury that they had written their verdict on the
wrong. form and that they did not intend to convict defendant of a misdemeanor
only, it was not error to send the jury back to reconsider and correct their
verdict; and, when the jury retired and later returned a verdict of guilty of a
felony as charged in the information, it was not error to receive and enter such
corrected verdict and to render judgment thereon.
ESCAPE.
State v. Cahill, Iowa, 194 N. W. 191. Sanitary conditions of cell where
prisoner ir kept in solitary confinement no justification for escape.
Prisoner was placed in solitary confinement for violation of prison rules
against fighting, was furnished an inadequate quantity of bread to eat, "and
was kept in a cell infested with bugs, worms and vermin, without a chair or
bed, with a toilet so out of repair (the evidence was conflicting on this point)
that when it was flushed the water ran out on the floor." Prisoner was suffering from lung trouble, which made such conditions the more unhealthful.
Defendant left his cell, and in a prosecution under the Iowa statute for
escaping, held that such conditions did not violate the constitutional provision
against cruel and unusual punishment, and did not constitute a defense.
State v. Cahill (supra).

When offense is completed.

Prisoner left his cell and was 'apprehended on the top of the penitentiary
wall, but before he had left the enclosure. Held, under the Iowa statute providing "if any person committed to the penitentiary . . . shall break such prison
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and escape therefrom, or shall escape from or leave without due authority any
building, camp, farm, garden, city, town, road, street, or any place whatsoever in which he is placed," tc. the offense was completed the moment that
person opened the door of his cell and ,vent to another part of the prison. It
was proper, therefore, to charge the completed offense and not merely an
"attempt."
The decision is clearly justified under the wording of the statute and,
while, perhaps, an unusually severe one, is nevertheless a disciplinary measure
and well within the power of the legislature.
EXTRADITION.

Gaines v. State, Texas, 251 S. W. 245. Extradition not involved where the
Federal Government arrests a person in one state and brings him to another.
Prisoner robbed a postoffice and murdered an employee in Dallas, Texas.
He was arrested in Indiana by the U. S. Government, and brought to Texas for
trial for the robbery, where he was arrested by state officers and charged with
the murder.
He contests the jurisdiction of the Texas court and relies on the rule that
a person extradited from one jurisdiction to another for one crime cannot be
tried for a different crime.
The court, while admitting that this is the rule where the government
extradites a criminal from a foreign country (citing Dominguez v. State, 234
S. V. 79, and Blandford v. State, 10 Texas App.'640), says by way of dictum
that the rule does not apply in the transfer of offenders from one state to
another. The actual ground of decision, however, is that under the facts no
extradition was involved for, when arrested, the prisoner was within the jurisdition of the U. S. and, with that jurisdiction still continuing, was brought into
the state of Texas. Once in the state of Texas, it was optional with the Federal Government whether he should be given over to state authorities, but having
been given over he is in no position to complain.
INDICTMENT.

Meredith v. Commonwealth, Kent., 252 S. W. 894.
offense does not invalidate.

Erroneous naming of

A grand jury indictment charged the defendant with the offense of "unlawfully operating an illicit or moonshine still," but in the body of the indictment
the offense was described as "manufacturing and attempting to manufacture
spirituous liquors." The statute under which the indictment was found (Sec. 3,
Chap. 33, Acts Gen. Assembly, 1922), made unlawful the manufacturing of
intoxicating liquor, but nowhere did it in express terms make unlawful the
mere operation of a still. Upon a demurrer, (1) that the indictment charged
no offense under the statute, (2) that the acts named in the descriptive part
did not constitute the offense named in the accusatory part; it was held that
the erroneous naming of the offense was not fatal where the descriptive part
was sufficient to identify it as the one intended to be charged and where the
indictment as a whole states the charge with sufficient clearness and certainty
to enable a person of common understanding to know what he is charged with.
The court quotes with approval from Overstreet v. Com., 147 Ky. 471, "and so
if the indictment is to be judged by strict standards of criminal pleading, the
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demurrer should have been sustained because under exact rules of pleading,
the identical offense charged should be described both in the accusative and descrptive parts; and the indictment that designated in the accusative part one
offense and described another in the body would be demurrable. But the strict
and technical rules of criminal pleading that prevailed at common law and for
many years in this state have been superseded by the more just and sensible
practice that declines to be controlled by unimportant and unsubstantial forms
that serve to delay and obstruct the administration of the criminal law without
protecting the accused if any right guaranteed to him by either the common
law or the constitution or statutes of the state."
PROSTITUTION.
Ex Parte Cannon, Texas, 250 S. W. 429. Constitutionality of penal ordinance prohibiting riding and walking with or visiting prostitutes.
The ordinance in question made it unlawful for any man to ride with or to
walk along the street, or to be together in public with a prostitute, or to be
found with a woman in a house of prostitution. Upon application for habeas
corpus, held, that the ordinance violated both the Federal and state constitutions
guaranteeing right to life, liberty and property.
The obvious purpose of the ordinance is wholesome, but its terms are too
broad and many of its sections make penal acts and persons which' and who
by no construction could be held to be crimes or criminals.

ROBBERY.
Karnes v. State, Ark., 252 S. W. 1.
one accused as accessory.

Abandonment of project as defense to

Defendant and Dill made a plan to rob one Black while Black was driving
a load of cotton between a certain town and his home.
Dill was to actually accompany Black and do the robbing, while it was
arranged that afterwards he was to meet the defendant at an appointed place.
The plan to rob entirely miscarried on the day set, but was subsequently committed at another place and under different circumstances. Defendant never
met Dill at the appointed place, and testified that he had entirely abandoned
the project.
Held: There was not sufficient evidence justifying an instruction on abandonment as a defense, McCollough, C.J., dissenting.
The decision is rested upon two main grounds: (1) That mere mental determination to abandon a project, without being communicated to the principal before commission of the crime is not a defense (which is obviously
sound). (2) Fact that crime was committed at a different time, place, and in
a different manner from that counselled is no defense. This is obviously sound
where the conspiracy centemplates the ultimate commission of the crime, the
means, date, and manner of commission being a mere detail.
As a general rule, however, withdrawal may be evidenced by acts as well
as words when the acts are of such a nature as to show to his confederates
that he disapproves or opposes the contempated crime. 16 C. J., pp 133-134.
Conceivably defendant's failure to meet his confederate at the place appointed (whichwas before the robbery actually took place) might be such an
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act; at any rate it would seem that the defendant was entitled to an instruction,
as the chief justice indicates in his dissenting opinion.
VENUE.

State v. Brown, Minn., 193 N. W. 169. C. 0. D. sale of intoxicating liquor.
The syllabus to the case states that where an order for liquor was taken
in Warren, Marshall County, by a firm doing business in Minneapolis, and the
liquor shipped to consignee, there was a sale at point of delivery. Taken alone,
such a statement is misleading and had the court meant a "sale" in the ordinary
legal meaning would be wrong on principle and contra to the great weight of
authority.
In a previous consideration of the case on appeal (186 N. W. 946), the
point was raised that the sale took place in Minneapolis and the court admitted
the general rule under the Sales Act that title in such cases passed when goods
answering to the description were delivered to the carrier. But the court went
on to say that the rule has no application to present facts, because intoxicating
liquors cannot be sold. "This was not a sale of goods that could be lawfully
sold. It requires a contract to pass title before actual delivery. There was
no contract in this case. The transaction was void at every step." Such an
argument would ordinarily defeat itself, for, if true, there could never be accomplished that which the statute has forbidden. This argument was mere dictum,
for the court expressly refused to pass upon the question whether there had
been a violation of the law either at Minneapolis or any other part prior to
their delivery at Warren, and placed its decision upon the ground that there
was a "furnishing" of the goods at Warren within the language of the statute
(Ch. 455, Laws of 1919)). "The terms sale and sell shall include all barters,
gifts and all means of furnishing liquor in violation or evasion of the law."

